The overall effect of the plan can be summed up as follows. Each nation grants the other nation`s air carriers transit privileges (freedoms one and two) to operate through each other`s airspace and land for non-traffic-related purposes on routes around the world subject to the Chicago Transit Agreement, including the right of the overflying nation to determine the transit route to follow on its territory and the airports to be used. Each nation also grants other commercial entry and exit privileges to relieve congestion and recover traffic (three, four and five); However, unlike transit privileges, these commercial privileges apply only to the airports mentioned in the agreement and on the routes mentioned in general and in accordance with certain general traffic principles and restrictions. The rates calculated between points on the territory of the two nations must depend on the agreement of governments within their respective jurisdictions. With respect to frequencies and capabilities, each designated nation or carrier is open to determining for itself the traffic offered to the public on designated trade routes, but operations must relate to traffic requirements and conduct in accordance with agreed principles of frequency and capacity. [iii] (a) The tariffs to be collected by the air carriers of a contracting party between points within the United States and points within the United Kingdom, in accordance with this annex, are subject to the agreement of the contracting parties, as part of their respective constitutional powers and obligations. In the event of a disagreement, the dispute is dealt with as outlined below. Bermuda II has been the subject of several revisions since its signing, the last in 1995.  Although Bermuda II was much less restrictive than the original Bermuda agreement it replaced, it was widely regarded as a very restrictive agreement, in the context of the continued liberalization of the regulatory framework applicable to the airline industry in different parts of the world. The main sensitive point that prevented the conclusion of a new transatlantic agreement on common airspace between the EU and the United States was that the United Kingdom and most other European countries considered the US version of open airspace to be too restrictive.